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Intelligence and espionage have been the subject of fascination for a long 
time. As a result, official and unofficial narratives of covert missions, under-
cover agents, and secret services have claimed substantial shelf space in librar-
ies and bookshops, while the ever- appealing genre of spy fiction has featured 
prominently in book pages and on cinema screens. Historians have not 
escaped the charms of this constantly evolving scholarly domain and have 
ceaselessly striven to reveal the past’s secrets and their keepers. This past, 
however, spans largely from the eve of the Great War to the Edward Snowden 
era, while more distant periods still remain largely unexplored.1 This is not to 
say that scholars have not made worthwhile attempts to explore and reduce 
this gap. Indeed, some excellent work has been done on the diplomatic and, 
by extension, intelligence operations of early modern states like England 
(and later Britain),2 France,3 the Dutch Republic,4 the Ottoman and Austrian 
Habsburg Empires,5 Portugal,6 Spain,7 and the dominant Italian states.8 
While in most of these states intelligence operations were organized by 
powerful individuals for the purpose of consolidating political power and con-
trol, Venice, as this chapter will show, organized an intelligence service that 
was centrally administered by the government. Indeed, in an exemplary dis-
play of political maturity, Venice created and systematized one of the world’s 
earliest centrally organized state intelligence services. This was responsible 
for the methodical organization of bureaucracy, diplomacy, and centralized 
intelligence that supported the city’s commercial and maritime supremacy.9 
At the helm of this process was the Council of Ten—Venice’s spy chiefs—
who, through an elaborate system of managerial delegation, masterminded 
and oversaw the clandestine activities of a great variety of professional and 
amateur spies and intelligencers. 
Utilizing freshly discovered material from the Venetian State Archives and 
the Vatican Secret Archives, this chapter will shed light on how the Council 
2 The Spy Chiefs of Renaissance Venice
Intelligence Leadership in the Early 
Modern World
Ioanna Iordanou
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of Ten pulled the strings of Venice’s centrally controlled intelligence opera-
tions. A long- overdue analysis of the council’s centralized administration and 
corporate- like leadership practices will demonstrate the effective organiza-
tion and the masterful system of rigid managerial delegation they employed 
in their efforts to administer Venice’s intelligence operations. Subsequently, 
the chapter will focus on the Ten’s remarkable ability to engage politically 
excluded commoners in politically significant clandestine missions, often with 
no financial benefit to them. In doing so, it will reveal a hitherto unknown 
facet of Venice’s popular classes. Finally, the last section of the chapter will 
offer an evaluation of the Ten’s leadership abilities as Venice’s spy chiefs. 
Overall, drawing on sociological theorizations of secrecy and discussions of 
the amorphous “Myth of Venice”—the contemporaneous view that the com-
mon good triumphed over private interests in the Venetian Republic—this 
chapter will contend that the Ten’s efficacy as spy chiefs was due to their effec-
tive construction of an exclusive community of followers sharing a collective 
identity that was premised on secrecy and, by extension, the principles of 
reciprocal confidence and trust. To incentivize participation, the Ten tapped 
into the commercial predisposition of Venetians, turning intelligence into a 
mutually beneficial transaction between rulers and ruled. Ultimately, to legit-
imize their actions, they made a public virtue of active contribution to the 
public good. In consequence, this chapter will show how the Ten’s leadership 
practices, which resulted from the heavy institutionalization and growing 
bureaucratization that pervaded the politics of Venice in the early modern 
period, bore a remarkable resemblance to both the “transactional” and “trans-
formational” styles of contemporary leadership practices. 
The Spy Chiefs of Renaissance Venice
“Once did she hold the gorgeous east in fee,” wrote the great Romantic Wil-
liam Wordsworth about Venice.10 This is because by the mid- sixteenth century 
the Republic of Venice had built a maritime empire with hegemony over the 
most strategic trade routes between the Levant and the Mediterranean world. 
This supremacy enabled Venice to control the market in luxury commodi-
ties like spices and silk from India and Egypt, which she defended zealously.11 
As a result, and owing to its strategic geographic position midway between 
Habsburg Spain and the Ottoman Levant, Venice gradually metamorphosed 
into a bustling emporium of traders, goods, and news.12 In fact, Venice, had 
already turned news into a commodity by the mid- sixteenth century, with the 
circulation of one of the world’s earliest newspapers, the gazeta della novita.13 
This was a monthly news publication targeted at merchants, informing them 
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of political events that could interfere with their business pursuits.14 It is not 
accidental, therefore, that the most famed line from Shakespeare’s The Mer-
chant of Venice, “What news on the Rialto?” sparks the report of the commer-
cial debacle of an alleged shipwreck. 
It is within this commercially charged political setting that Venice’s spy 
chiefs constructed its centrally organized state intelligence service. Estab-
lished in 1310 under Doge Piero Gradenigo, the Council of Ten was the exclu-
sive committee responsible for state security. Within its jurisdiction were 
secret affairs, public order, and domestic and foreign policy. The council was 
actually made up of seventeen men, who included ten ordinary members, six 
ducal councilors, and in the chair, the Doge. Every month three members 
took turns at heading the Ten’s operations. They were called Capi, the heads 
of the Ten.15 
Initially, the Ten were tasked with protecting the government from over-
throw or corruption. Progressively, however, their powers extended to such 
a degree that, by the mid- fifteenth century, they encompassed Venice’s dip-
lomatic and intelligence operations, military affairs, and other legal matters 
of state security. Such weighty responsibilities, so central to the city’s gover-
nance, merited a prominent place in the city’s topography. The Ten, therefore, 
Photo 2.1 The “Giovedì Grasso” Festival in front of the Ducal Palace in Venice, 
1765/1766, by Canaletto. (Wolfgang Ratjen Collection, Paul Mellon Fund, National 
Gallery of Art)
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were housed in one of the most impressive state intelligence headquarters 
of the early modern (and even the modern) world, the Ducal Palace, over-
looking the Venetian lagoon in Saint Mark’s Square. There the Ten organized 
and administered the world’s earliest state intelligence service. In a way, this 
resembled a kind of proto- modern public sector organization that operated 
with remarkable maturity. Its organization comprised several departments, 
including operations, science and technology, and analysis.16 This service was 
also supported by several other state departments, including the Senate, the 
Collegio (an executive branch of the government), and the office of state attor-
neys (Avogaria di Comun).
Gradually, the Ten, together with the Collegio, assumed almost complete 
control of the government.17 This, inexorably, gave them the bad name of 
being authoritarian. Indeed, the autocratic way in which the Ten wielded 
their power tarnished their reputation. Their infamous eruptions were com-
mitted to ink by several contemporaneous chroniclers, such as the inveterate 
diarist Marino Sanudo. “This Council imposes banishment and exile upon 
nobles, and has others burned or hanged if they deserve it, and has authority 
to dismiss the Prince, even to do other things to him if he so deserves,” he 
once wrote in his account of Venice’s quotidian existence.18 The Ten’s alleged 
authoritarianism stemmed out of respect for two fundamental Venetian val-
ues: order that was achieved by secrecy, and maturity that was guaranteed by 
gerontocracy. Both these virtues were deemed paramount for state security.19 
It is not a coincidence, therefore, that the Ten’s stringent regulations did not 
exclude the council’s members. As the responsible body for state security, if 
they failed to act speedily on issues that imperiled it, they became liable to a 
1,000- ducat fine.20 
In a way, the Ten seemed to espouse Machiavelli’s maxim that a prince 
“must not worry if he incurs reproach for his cruelty, so long as he keeps 
his subjects united and loyal. By making an example or two, he will prove 
more compassionate than those who, being too compassionate, allow disor-
ders which lead to murder and rapine.”21 Yet their authoritarian tendencies 
were not left uncontrolled. The extraordinarily mature Venetian political 
system endeavored to contain any potential autocracy, at least in principle. 
The institution of the zonta (the Venetian linguistic variation of aggiunta or 
addizione, meaning “addition”) was the mechanism put in place for that pur-
pose. The zonta was an adjunct commission of fifteen men participating in 
all important assemblies of the Council of Ten. Either elected or co- opted, 
they played the role of an arbitrary referee whose duty was to recognize and 
combat instances of nepotism and cronyism. It was usually made up of patri-
cians who had not secured election to the other exclusive governing bodies. 
The zonta, therefore, was a “constitutional shortcut” for those noblemen who 
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wished to actively participate in Venetian oligarchy but had not accumulated 
the necessary backing.22 
By the beginning of the sixteenth century several significant state affairs, 
like the ongoing war with the Ottomans and the specter of the new Portuguese 
spice route, rendered the protection of state secrets a matter of urgency. As 
a result, in 1539 the Council of Ten, with the blessing of the Senate and the 
Great Council (the assembly of the Venetian aristocracy), decided to estab-
lish a counterintelligence authority. This took shape in the institution of the 
Inquisitors of the State.23 Initially titled “Inquisitors against the Disclosures 
of Secrets,” the State Inquisitors were a special magistracy made up of three 
men, two from the ranks of the Ten and one ducal councilor.24 While they 
were primarily responsible for counterintelligence and the protection of state 
secrets, gradually their activity encompassed all aspects of state security, 
including conspiracies, betrayals, public order, and espionage.25 All of these 
were expected to be concealed under a thick mantle of secrecy.
Secrecy, a State Virtue
Secrecy was one of the most important virtues demanded by the Ten. This 
is because, to them, it epitomized harmony and civic concord.26 In a minia-
ture island of 150,000 inhabitants,27 rumors and fabrications, especially those 
exposing conflict and dispute, were precarious for domestic security. Thus 
they ought to be concealed at all costs.28 As such, Venetian patricians who 
sat on government councils were forbidden by law to reveal any disputes or 
debates arising during assemblies. Disobedience was punishable by death 
and the subsequent confiscation of all personal possessions.29 This stringent 
legislation made up for the lack of a royal court, where sensitive informa-
tion could be confined and safeguarded. In practice, however, secrecy was far 
from achieved in Venice. In a city so obsessed with news, chatter circulated 
through the maze of Venice’s canals and labyrinth of streets at great speed. 
Ironically, while the Venetian ruling class was ordered to keep quiet, the 
Venetian ruled were urged to speak up. In consequence, gathering and divulg-
ing information that pertained to state security was considered an act of good 
citizenship. If citizens became aware of potential threats to the stability of the 
state, they were urged to inform the authorities through formal denunciations. 
These were to be left in any public place, including churches, the stairs of state 
buildings, even the doorsteps of government officials. These denunciations 
were treated with utmost solemnity by the Ten. 
To facilitate this process of state control, by the late sixteenth century the 
authorities had invented the premodern version of surveillance cameras, the 
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infamous bocche di leone.30 Sculpted in the shape of lions’ mouths—as their 
name indicates—and resembling carved carnival masks, these were postboxes 
into whose orifice denizens were invited to deposit denunciations on any issue 
of public order and security. Venetians took to this “I spy with my little eye” 
pastime with great zeal and even paid for the services of professional scribes, 
as the documents’ immaculate penmanship reveals.31 This had tragicomic 
implications, as the inveterate informers could not see a distinction between 
major and minor threats. As a result, a blizzard of worthless reports flooded 
the Ducal Palace on a daily basis. To contain their frequency, in 1542 the gov-
ernment passed a law whereby, to be valid, all anonymous denunciations had 
to be signed by three witnesses.32 
This impediment did not have the intended effect, and the craze for this 
tell- tale game assumed gigantic proportions and lasted until the fall of the Ve-
netian Republic in 1797. This is because the authorities were eager to reward 
worthy revelations.33 As a result, the city turned into what can be regarded as 
a “Big Brother” studio, where nothing escaped the ears and eyes of the numer-
ous self- appointed spooks.34 These denouncers penetrated all social circles 
and reported on anyone and anything that could pose a threat, from gamblers 
and suspicious foreigners to potential heretics and foreign ambassadors.35 A 
well- known victim of denunciation was the infamous Venetian womanizer 
Giacomo Casanova. In 1755, aged thirty, Casanova was sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment in the Ducal Palace’s piombe, the terrifying cells reserved for 
political criminals. His conviction was a result of several denunciations by 
aggrieved husbands, religious devotees, and righteous city dwellers.36 His 
crimes can be summed up as insatiable promiscuity, sensationalist religious 
sophistries, and a libertine lifestyle, all of which were deemed threatening to 
state security. Ironically, Casanova’s mischievous disposition—that led to his 
spectacular prison escape just over a year after his arrest—not only set him on 
the path to stardom but also to the Venetian authorities’ payroll as a profes-
sional secret agent.37 The interested reader can find enthralling details of this 
story in his oft- reprinted Histoire de ma fuite (Story of My Flight).38
Central Intelligence Administration and  
Corporate- like Leadership
So, how did the Council of Ten and its subordinate body, the Inquisitors of 
the State, manage to collect the intelligence necessary for the Venetian state’s 
domestic and foreign security? This became possible through the spies and 
informants they employed. Before getting acquainted with these information 
procurers, it is important to contextualize intelligence in the early modern 
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period. What exactly was intelligence at that time? Was it a state affair or a 
private initiative? A professional service or a civic duty? An act of institu-
tional loyalty or financial need? In early modern Venice, intelligence was all 
of the above. For Venetians, the word intelligentia meant “communication” or 
“understanding.” Within the context of state security, it indicated any kind of 
information of a political, economic, social, or cultural nature that was worthy 
of evaluation and potential action by the government. But how did informa-
tion arrive at the Venetian intelligence headquarters?
The Council of Ten was responsible for the central administration of 
intelligence- gathering and espionage in Venice. To this end, the Ten mas-
terminded and oversaw a network of professional and amateur informers 
that branched out into three key communication channels: the professional 
channel, composed of the official diplomats and state servants; the mercantile 
channel, made up of Venetian merchants located in commercial hubs of stra-
tegic significance, like the territories of the Levant;39 and the amateur channel, 
whereby individuals at all levels of society, either anonymously or disclosing 
their identity, for a fee or gratis, gathered and disclosed information relevant 
to the security of the state. To be sure, disentangling hard facts from rumors 
and fabrications was not an easy task. Yet the existence of these channels 
enabled the systematic evaluation of information through a process of com-
paring and contrasting.40 Depending on the channel, a plethora of formal or 
informal spies and informers were recruited for intelligence purposes.
The Professional Communication Channel 
“An ambassador,” once wrote Henry Wotton, “is an honest man, sent abroad 
to lie for the good of his country.”41 The Venetian ambassador, as the offi-
cial formal representative, was the most obvious professional informant. The 
gradual systematization of bureaucratic and administrative processes in the 
early modern period owes much to the organized information networks of 
embassies. Venetian ambassadors were instrumental in this process.42 Tasked 
with three primary responsibilities—representation, negotiation, and the 
collection of information—they had mastered the art of covert communi-
cation from early on.43 Indeed, Venice was one of the first Italian states to 
establish resident embassies abroad.44 By the sixteenth century Venice had 
managed to secure permanent representation in all leading states of early 
modern Europe, and its ambassadors professionalized the act of clandestine 
information- gathering and reportage. They did so through their meticulous 
composition and dispatch of detailed intelligence reports that were often 
written in cipher to ensure secrecy. 
Ambassadors acted as the heads of intelligence operations within the ter-
ritory of their jurisdiction. To successfully fulfill their responsibilities, they 
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employed and managed their own spies and informers. These were paid for by 
a discrete budget granted to them for “secret expenses.”45 In 1586, for instance, 
the Venetian ambassador in Spain reported to the State Inquisitors that he had 
“recruited” a blue- blooded spy from within the royal Spanish entourage. The 
new recruit’s compensation was in kind, particularly in fine muscat wines, as 
his status precluded monetary bribes.46 High- class informers from the Spanish 
court were quite eclectic in their choice of compensation. In 1576, the Ve-
netian ambassador in Madrid communicated to the Ten the desire of Anto-
nio Pérez, Philip II’s secretary of state (who was just about to fall from grace 
by being accused of treason) to acquire a “good old” painting of Titian’s in 
exchange for “great benefits” for Venice. The council unanimously agreed to 
disburse 200 ducats for this purpose.47 The gift must have born fruit, as two 
years later the Ten decided to increase their spending on Titian’s art to 500 
ducats in order to keep the secretary gratified.48 Could any of these rewards 
be Titian’s The Fall of Man, now at the Prado?49 
The professional communication channel of Venice’s intelligence service 
was not solely restricted to formal exchanges between ambassadors and the 
ruler, as was the case with the other Italian states.50 This channel was so metic-
ulously organized that its highly sophisticated diplomatic network branched 
out to officially appointed representatives in the Venetian- dominated regions 
of the Balkans and the Mediterranean (the Provveditori); the Venetian cities of 
the Italian mainland (the rettori); and other Mediterranean regions where 
there was a notable Venetian merchant presence (the consoli) but no formal 
diplomatic representation. Intelligence- gathering and espionage were consid-
ered part of these envoys’ responsibilities. Accordingly, they were expected to 
recruit and manage their individual spies and informants. 
In July 1533, for instance, while the war with the Ottomans was imminent, 
the governor of Zante received direct orders from the Ten to send a “practi-
cal and faithful” messenger to Admiral Andrea Doria, the legendary Genoese 
mercenary commander (condottiere). During the first half of the sixteenth cen-
tury, Doria had been the nemesis of the Ottomans in the Levant, patrolling 
the Mediterranean and launching several naval expeditions against the Turks 
and other Barbary corsairs.51 It was obvious that the Ten had a top- secret mes-
sage to convey to Doria, as the governor was ordered to refrain from written 
communication with the messenger, most probably for secrecy purposes. In 
consequence, he was advised to find an informant who spoke Turkish or any 
other language that Doria spoke, in order to forgo the need for an interpreter. 
If the latter was unavoidable, the governor was instructed not to use a well- 
known Genoese translator who was also in the Ottomans’ employ. The Ten 
expected reports on the progress of the mission in cipher.52 
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On a similar note, in July 1574 the Ten requested from the rector of the 
Venetian city of Brescia the whereabouts of a certain Giulio Sala. Sala was 
suspected of treasonous dealings with the Spanish and was believed to have 
involved his cronies in his machinations. The Brescian authorities were asked 
to locate him and ship him off to the prisons of the Ten while keeping a close 
eye on his relatives and acquaintances. They were also ordered to change all 
the guards on the city’s gates, most probably suspecting that Sala could have 
bribed them in order to escape.53 Ordering the alternation of the guards’ shifts, 
so that they were constantly placed at different places on the city’s walls and 
forts, was a common tactic employed by the Ten to prevent the guards’ col-
laboration with potential traitors.54
Venetian governors were given even more daring clandestine missions. 
In July 1570, as the Papal representative in Venice reported to Rome, it was 
learned that the Ottomans were engineering the seizure of Spalato, a Vene-
tian colony in Dalmatia.55 A secret missive was dispatched to the local gover-
nor, containing eight bottles of poison. The lethal liquid was intended for the 
contamination of the water supply of the advancing Ottomans. The governor 
was instructed to be extremely careful in carrying out his mission so that the 
quality of the water of the Christian population living there, and thus its safety, 
was not affected.56 Indeed, sanitation was one of the Ten’s top domestic secu-
rity priorities.
Even the Venetian consuls who were stationed in cities with no perma-
nent diplomatic representation were tasked with the provision of vital intel-
ligence.57 Consuls were not formal diplomats but acted as intermediaries 
between Venetian envoys abroad and the intelligence headquarters in the 
Ducal Palace. Thus, on several occasions they oversaw the safe exchange of 
letters between the Ten and the designated Venetian diplomat in the region.58 
Their responsibilities could also extend to intelligence missions if this was 
considered necessary by the Ducal Palace. At the close of the sixteenth cen-
tury, for example, the consul of Aleppo in Syria received direct instructions 
to gather information on Turkish affairs (and a large reward).59 
All these instances demonstrate that the professional channel of information- 
gathering and reportage that the Council of Ten had devised was complex. Yet 
the Ten managed it through a meticulous system of delegation. The Vene-
tian spy chiefs did not micromanage their underlings. They delegated and 
expected detailed reports on execution—more often than not in cipher—
trusting that their appointees would successfully carry out the job. As the 
central executive committee, they also oversaw the effective communication 
of information about significant developments to all their delegates who could 
benefit from it, not just the ones directly involved in the events concerned. 
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When a major diplomatic scandal nearly broke in 1574, for instance, because 
the French ambassador refused to surrender a Venetian turncoat who revealed 
state secrets to the French, communication was sent not only to the Venetian 
ambassador in France, but also to the bailo (the Venetian ambassador in the 
Ottoman capital) in Constantinople. The former was instructed to appeal to 
the king of France for a “more dexterous” ambassador; the latter was charged 
with communicating the events to the sultan, who was always interested in 
French affairs.60 
Finally, in a good example of modern- day business leadership, the Vene-
tian spy chiefs were generous in acknowledging their trust in their underlings. 
“We are convinced of your utmost prudence in assigning this undertaking 
to a person of trust, as befits such a mission,” they informed the governor 
of Zante when they asked him to find a messenger for Doria.61 “We applaud 
the manner in which you ‘bought off the soul’ of Feridun Agà, as a person 
who can advance our interests in that Porte. And we approve of the manner 
in which you presented the affair. You are granted permission to render him 
your informant,” they wrote to the bailo.62 This system of delegation of duties, 
infused with qualities of trust, acknowledgment, even reward, set the Ve-
netian apparatus apart from those of other Italian states’ intelligence oper-
ations. Those were restricted to direct communication between rulers and 
their ambassadors, without the systematized contribution of other formally 
appointed intermediaries.63
The Mercantile Communication Channel 
The intelligence network that the Venetian spy chiefs created with such refine-
ment was not confined to the diplomatic and political sphere. In a less formal 
yet equally meaningful manner, Venetian merchants and businessmen who 
were frequent travelers in the Mediterranean and the Levant made up the 
mercantile channel of intelligence- gathering and reportage. As adroit dealers 
in goods and news, Venetian merchants were aware of the value of good (and 
at times covert) intelligence for competitive advantage.64 They thus made 
perfect undercover spies for the Venetian authorities. In 1496, for instance, 
at a time of diplomatic turbulence between the Ottoman Empire and Venice, 
the young merchant and future Doge of Venice Andrea Gritti was residing 
in Constantinople. In the absence of a bailo, who had been expelled a few 
years earlier when he was discovered to spy for the Spanish,65 Gritti took the 
reins of diplomatic negotiations. In 1497 he convinced the sultan to overturn 
the embargo on grain export that the Ottomans had imposed on Italian mer-
chants in Constantinople.66 In 1503 he successfully negotiated the final details 
of the peace treaty between Venice and the Ottoman Empire.67 His diplomatic 
missives to the motherland were overflowing with intelligence on the size and 
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moves of the Ottoman fleet. To divert suspicion he coded his dispatches in 
commercial jargon and presented them as business communications instead. 
Once, he sent a letter informing the authorities that commercial goods were 
arriving in Venice from sea and land. The actual meaning of this report was 
that the Ottomans were preparing to attack with their fleet and army.68 
Constantinople was a strategic hub of both economic and political signif-
icance for Venice. It was not surprising, therefore, that Venetian merchants 
living in the city doubled as covert informants or spies for the Republic. Leo-
nin Servo, a Venetian subject of Cretan origins, was a merchant residing in the 
Ottoman capital. With an impressive network of connections and knowledge 
of current affairs, he acted as an informer to the bailo and the Ten through-
out his residence in that city.69 In July 1566 he notified the bailo that Ibrahim 
Granatin, a favorite of Sokollu Mehmet Pasha and a foe of Venice, was en 
route to the city. The news had already reached Venice a month earlier and 
had caused uproar among the Ten,70 who ordered Granatin’s assassination as 
a top- secret priority.71 So dexterous was Servo in smuggling covert commu-
nications to Venice that he allegedly hid letters of the bailo Barbaro in hollow 
canes and transported them on board his ship.72 Often even when not on of-
ficial covert missions, Venetian merchants considered it their duty to pass on 
news of any suspicious maneuvers of enemy ships, especially from areas of the 
Middle East where they were stationed.73 
The Amateur Communication Channel
In the early modern period, Venice was a maritime and commercial empire. 
Unlike other European states, its ruling class—the patricians—were first and 
foremost merchants who made their living through trade. The citizens, the 
“secondary elite” of Venice,74 followed in their footsteps.75 And of course, 
in a city of craftsmen and traders, the popular masses had been spoon- fed 
a steady diet of capitalist ideals. Within this context, the business shrewd-
ness of Venice’s spy chiefs devised several ways to benefit from the personal 
intelligence- gathering pursuits of all layers of Venetian society.76 These even 
included individuals of different ethnicities and religions.
Jews made perfect undercover agents for the Ten, owing to their disenfran-
chisement as people at the margins of society and their much sought- after pro-
fessional expertise, especially in medicine and commerce. In the next chap-
ter, Emrah Safa Gürkan shows how the Jewish physician Solomon Ashkenazi 
smuggled the letters of bailo Barbaro in his shoes and shipped them off to Ven-
ice when the bailo was under house arrest.77 At around the same time, in the 
1570s, the Jewish merchant Hayyim Saruk from Thessaloniki was appointed 
to spy on “the affairs, designs and military equipment of the Turks” in Con-
stantinople. For this purpose he even produced a self- made merchant- style 
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cipher, in which he coded the Ottomans as “drugs,” people as “money,” and 
dispatches as “purchases.” His compensation reached the staggering sum of 
500 ducats at a time when the starting salary of a Venetian cryptanalyst was 50 
ducats annually.78 
Intelligence concerned more than the city’s foreign affairs. Domestic secu-
rity was of the utmost importance to the authorities, and this domain was 
overseen by the State Inquisitors. For this purpose, they maintained contact 
with distinguished individuals and well- connected professionals, whom they 
put on the formal payroll at times. Lawyers and notaries, who had direct 
access to their clients’ private affairs, formed part of this group. In 1616, for 
instance, a lawyer boastfully told the Inquisitors that “lawyers have the occa-
sion of hearing many of their clients’ private affairs and, when a gentleman 
hears something concerning the interest of the state, he must at all costs let 
your Excellencies know about it.”79 Of course, when the opportunity arose 
to fill their pockets, some of these gentlemen did not hesitate to leak infor-
mation to the Spanish and French ambassadors, whose purse strings always 
became loose at the prospect of valuable information.80 At times, the services 
of these specialist agents extended to duties more daring than the supply of 
information. In 1574, for instance, the professor of botany at the University of 
Padua was entrusted with the production of a deadly poison that was intended 
for a villainous Ottoman spy. When he botched the job, the Ten appointed a 
physician to carry out the task.81
More impressively, commoners of various backgrounds and occupations 
were directly or indirectly urged to take part in the Republic’s clandestine mis-
sions. Residents in Venetian subject territories were among the most sought- 
after informants owing to their local knowledge. In November 1570, on the 
eve of the war with the Turks, the mission of the Cypriot Manoli Soriano 
involved attacking the Ottoman settlements in the town of Skradin (situated 
in modern Croatia) and setting fire to the Ottoman fleet stationed in the east-
ern Adriatic.82 The authorities rewarded brazen acts in a variety of ways. Ban-
ished criminals, for example, were granted the revocation of their sentence 
in exchange for taking part in intelligence operations. To successfully carry 
out his daring mission, Soriano requested a squadron of three hundred men. 
As several of them were expected to be exiled convicts, the condition set was 
that, upon completion of the operation, their banishment would be revoked.83 
As this commodification of intelligence gradually put down roots in Ven-
ice, it became more common for banished felons to become secret agents in 
return for their freedom.84 A striking example, in a later era, is, once again, 
the serial seducer Giacomo Casanova. Owing to his spectacular escape from 
the ducal penitentiary and the countless connections his dissolute lifestyle 
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had yielded, Casanova managed to get headhunted by the State Inquisitors. 
In consequence, for nearly twenty years after his daring escape from the city 
that subsequently banished him, when in need of cash Casanova offered his 
services to the Republic as a “secret agent,” hoping for a revocation of his 
expulsion.85 For this purpose, he kept his eyes on anyone or anything that 
could be considered mildly suspicious. It took him quite some time to find a 
target until, in 1770, he exposed and halted the illegal operation of an Arme-
nian printing house in Trieste that was competing with its Venetian counter-
part. This was his golden ticket back to Venice.86
Leadership, Identity, and the “Myth of Venice” 
It is evident that Venice created an extremely efficient state intelligence 
apparatus that operated like a public sector organization. Notable for evolv-
ing processes of institutionalization and bureaucratization, this organiza-
tion was steered by the Council of Ten, who acted as the chief executives. 
As mentioned previously, the highly developed management processes and 
central administration of the Venetian intelligence service rendered it unique 
among contemporaneous Italian and European states. Other states largely 
confined themselves to communication between the ruler and his ambassa-
dors, in the case of the former,87 or were organized by prominent individuals 
for personal advancement, in the case of the latter.88 In a striking demonstra-
tion of organizational maturity, the Ten created a seamless system of mana-
gerial delegation that branched out into three communication channels, the 
professional, the mercantile, and the amateur. While it is easier to understand 
how the Ten managed the formally appointed delegates who made up the 
professional channel of communication—the ambassadors, the governors, 
and other state officials—what is striking is their ability to recruit and direct a 
large number of informally appointed spies and intelligencers from the ranks 
of Venice’s mercantile community and the wider public. A key question arises 
in this connection: How did the Ten get the public to cooperate in their state 
security pursuits, even when financial benefits were not guaranteed?
One definition of leadership implies persuading the collective to take 
responsibility for complex collective problems.89 This accomplishment pre-
supposes that the collective has accepted its position as the followers and is 
receptive to being led by the leader. Leaders, thus, cannot exist in isolation 
from a group of followers. In other words, a leader’s authority is sanctioned by 
the followers’ identification and self- acceptance as followers. According to this 
definition, leadership is premised on two prerequisites: the creation of a group 
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that followers can feel part of and wittingly situate themselves in,90 and the 
mobilization of that group to proceed to certain actions that the leader deems 
necessary.91 In effect, leadership presupposes the social construction of the 
context that legitimizes a particular action by a group at a specific point in 
time.92 Using this definition, how can we evaluate the Ten’s leadership? 
Let us start with the first prerequisite, the creation of a group of followers. 
The foundation of any collective is rooted in a socially constructed, shared 
identity. Identity is not a rigid entity but “a social, contingent, discursive and 
dynamic phenomenon.”93 It is predicated on the creation of a me or us and a 
them,94 which, by extension, erects social and cognitive boundaries between 
insiders and outsiders.95 It is the responsibility of the leader to construct an 
identity that potential followers can share so as to become part of the intended 
group.96 This is because only through creating a shared identity can a leader 
construct the group of followers that will advance intended strategies.97 Were 
the Venetian spy chiefs successful in creating such a group?
Intelligence, as a social process, presupposes secrecy, one of the Ten’s most 
revered virtues. Secrecy, as per its sociological theorizations, is instrumen-
tal in identity construction.98 This is because it enables the creation of the 
boundary between two separate entities, those in the know and the ignorant 
others. The exclusivity of being in the know, compared to the ignorant others, 
can boost the sense of distinctive inclusiveness in a group and, by extension, 
cement one’s identification with it.99 Additionally, the social aspect of secrecy 
that requires and promotes the conscious awareness of the group owing to 
the intention of concealment and boundary construction can enhance the 
process of group identity creation.100 The sense of belonging that ensues can 
potentially augment the need to protect and perpetuate secrecy so as to main-
tain the group. Secrecy, therefore, creates a dynamic and ongoing relationship 
between its agents and becomes both the condition and the consequence of 
the formation of group identity.101 By actively inviting ordinary Venetians to 
take part in clandestine communication of information even in informal ways, 
the Ten created an exclusive group of people whose common identity was 
premised on secrecy and, by extension, the principles of reciprocal confidence 
and trust.102 
This interpretation of the Ten’s leadership challenges the conventional 
appreciation of early modern commoners as either devoid of political con-
sciousness or rebellious against the state, owing to their exclusion from polit-
ical participation.103 In Venice a whole body of contemporaneous celebratory 
literature attributed the city’s unique internal stability to the political exclusion 
of the commoners.104 Even the guilds and their representatives were offered 
no political representation and were closely monitored by the authorities.105 
Still, are not anonymous denunciations and voluntary or even casual salaried 
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intelligence missions politicized (if not political) acts? What made people who 
were excluded from politics engage willingly—and more often than not with-
out payment—in such pursuits, even at their own expense at times? In other 
words, how did the Venetian spy chiefs legitimize the necessary actions—the 
second prerequisite of leadership—required to advance their strategies? 
“Identity,” claims one of the most eminent leadership literati, “is con-
structed out of the amorphous baggage of myth and the contested resources 
of history.”106 Thus, to successfully instigate the construction of an identity 
that followers can share, the leader’s job is to create a shared vision for the 
present and the future and the sociopolitical conditions that necessitate and 
legitimize the followers’ action so as to achieve the intended vision. The Ten’s 
exhortations to the people, that still survive en masse in the Venetian State 
Archives, expressed the state’s consistent preoccupation with prioritizing the 
servizio publico, the public good, that was the mainstay of Venice’s security and 
serenity. Their bombastic pronouncements on this subject, that is evident in 
nearly every document they produced, from secret reports to public procla-
mations, proclaimed everyone’s obligation, prevailing over any private profit, 
to support the state’s efforts to uphold that vision of public good. Remarkably, 
the commoners’ denunciations and reports also expressed this belief in “the 
obligation of my loyalty” to the state.107 
This happy image of communal serenity triumphing over private inter-
ests and discrepancies was the essence of the famous “Myth of Venice.”108 
Although historiographical debates over the validity of the “Myth of Venice” 
are beyond the scope of this chapter, Venetian history abounds with instances 
of “community spirit” instigating action for the “common good.”109 Empower-
ing followers to pursue the leader’s intended vision through the creation of a 
collective sense of identity is the essence of “transformational” leadership.110 
In effect, transformational leaders have the ability to inspire and motivate 
their followers to act for a shared vision. The Ten were adept at this style of 
leadership. But how did they manage to persuade Venetians to contribute to 
the collective good through their formal or informal involvement in clandes-
tine undertakings?
To incentivize cooperation, the authorities mobilized the quintessential 
Venetian activity: trade. In a state where political and diplomatic activities 
influenced successful commercial transactions and vice versa, intelligence was 
turned into a trade of information for benefits. Espionage became a transac-
tion between followers and leaders whereby the former expected some kind 
of benefit in return for services rendered, while the latter advanced strategic 
objectives by obtaining information. Enshrined in this commodification of 
intelligence, ordinary Venetians, who were excluded from political partici-
pation, developed a political purpose within the state, one that was masked 
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in the form of business.111 The Ten employed what in contemporary leader-
ship parlance would be called a “transactional” leadership style whereby the 
leader exchanges favors and tangible rewards for services rendered by the 
followers.112 
Had all this taken place in a later era, the commercial character of early 
modern Venice could easily have made Benjamin Franklin snub it as “no lon-
ger a Nation, but a great Shop.”113 Adam Smith could have fallen into the trap 
of misperceiving it as a state of shopkeepers or, more precisely, a state “whose 
government is influenced by shopkeepers.”114 Yet Venetians were not devoid of 
sensitivity to state security, nor were they enticed solely by the lure of rewards. 
As recent scholarship has shown, ordinary Venetians saw it as incumbent on 
themselves to contribute to the common good. This predisposition stemmed 
from their communal sense of pride that was partly rooted in their professional 
identity.115 The thorough organization of the Venetian workforce into guilds 
facilitated this process.116 In fact, the government was notorious for inducing 
certain professional groups to perform particular tasks by presenting them 
as the privilege of service to the state.117 In the same way, the Ten presented 
the need for intelligence as the privilege of contributing to the security and 
posterity of the Serenissima, “the most serene of states.” Accordingly, report-
ing on anything that could pose a threat to the state, including the minutiae 
of daily life, became the discharge of one’s duty of contributing to the com-
munity. Indeed, a Venetian subject was made to feel obliged “to dedicate his 
everything, even his life” to the Republic.118 This was the “Myth of Venice” in 
full flower. 
While the “Myth of Venice” was merely a compelling narrative intended to 
legitimize the Venetians’ cooperation in clandestine activities, it also reflects 
the Ten’s achievement in smoothly wielding two different styles of leader-
ship: the transformational style by which they inspired their followers to take 
action, and the transactional style whereby they offered favors and tangible 
benefits in exchange for public service. In essence, the Ten’s followers were 
made to feel themselves to be an indispensable part of a state apparatus that 
operated for the public benefit—the preservation of the glorious Venice of the 
past and the future, a bustling emporium of commodities, prospering by its 
people working for its people. 
This idealized portrayal of the Ten’s leadership is by no means the whole 
picture. It is doubtful that they or their delegates thought of any myth when 
going about their daily business. Their intention was not to construct a myth 
but to create what generated it, a community spirit that guided people’s 
actions toward the common good. If this intention developed into a myth, this 
is a different story. Even so, the discussion of Venice’s myth is unavoidable, as 
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“inevitably, whoever writes the history of Venice seems condemned to write 
the history of its myths.”119 In a way, the myth is to the historian of Venice what 
the bocca di leone is to the visitor to this remarkable city: an indispensable 
prop in the phantasmagoria of Venice through the centuries. 
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